Incumbent innovation and domestic entry by Oliver Falck et al.
Incumbent innovation and domestic entry
Oliver Falck Æ Stephan Heblich Æ Stefan Kipar
Accepted: 31 May 2009 / Published online: 25 June 2009
 The Author(s) 2009. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract This paper analyzes the escape-entry
incentive for innovation by incumbent firms. The
threat posed by the possibility of leading-edge firms
entering the market influences incumbent innovation.
To overcome problems of endogeneity, we apply an
instrumental variable approach to analyze a rich firm-
level dataset (1987–2000) for Germany. We find
evidence that domestic entry has a negative effect on
incumbent product innovation, which is a strong
indication of new entrants’ comparative advantage in
commercializing new ideas. In contrast, domestic
entry has a positive effect on incumbent process
innovations, an effect also known as the escape-entry
effect.
Keywords Entry  Process innovation 
Product innovation
JEL Classifications O3  L16  L26  M13
1 Introduction
New firm entry has a definite impact on incumbent
firms. Schumpeter (1912) describes this effect as the
process of creative destruction: new replacing old,
thereby stimulating change. In line with this view,
Aghion et al. (2009) describe a firm’s incentive to
innovate as an escape-entry strategy, that is, in order
to discourage leading-edge competitive entry, an
incumbent at the technology frontier will innovate in
order to maintain its market position. In their
analysis, the authors assume that leading-edge entry
is foreign entry, which is then instrumented by
exogenous changes in entry regulation. Based on a
sample of UK firms, Aghion et al. (2009) find a
positive escape-entry effect from foreign entry on
domestic incumbents if the incumbents are at the
technology frontier. In contrast, when they take
domestic entry into consideration in their robustness
checks, no significant effect of domestic entry on
incumbent innovation is found. However, the authors
do note that this could result from their aggregated
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domestic entry data, which does not distinguish
between types of domestic entrants.
In this article, we look at domestic entrants and
their impact on incumbent innovation. To estimate
the effect of domestic entry on incumbent firm
performance, we employ an instrumental variable
(IV) approach based on theories by Klepper (1996)
and Duranton and Puga (2001, 2005). Klepper applies
the idea of an industry lifecycle to describe how entry
and innovation evolve from the birth of a technolog-
ically progressive industry through its maturity. In
this process, the number of entrants follows an
inverted U-shape through the lifecycle so that during
the early stage of the industry, the number of entrants
increases, reaches a peak, and then, in maturity,
declines. During the period of increasing entry, new
firms account for important product innovations.
Throughout the industry lifecycle, incumbent firms
devote increasing efforts at process innovation
instead of product innovations.
Duranton and Puga (2001, 2005) add spatial
dimension to the industry lifecycle concept. For our
purpose, the most crucial aspect of their argument is
that spatial industry concentration increases through-
out the industry lifecycle. Duranton and Puga’s (2001)
first model on process innovation explains the
relationship between high entry levels and diverse,
specialized cities. These industries are located on
the left—i.e., increasing—side of Klepper’s inverted
U. Duranton and Puga argue that entrepreneurs
develop new products in diversified cities where they
can try processes borrowed from other activities.
However, once a firm finds its ideal process, it
switches to mass production and relocates to a
specialized city where production costs are lower.
Based on their model, Duranton and Puga argue that
industries with a high level of innovative entry are
more likely to benefit from the advantages offered by
diversity and specialization. Accordingly, firms in
mature industries have a greater tendency to relocate
from diversified to specialized areas, which should
result in increasing industry concentration.
Duranton and Puga’s second model (2005) on
functional specialization explains the relationship
between industries dominated by large incumbent
firms and diverse, specialized cities. These industries
are on the right—i.e. decreasing—side of Klepper’s
inverted U. Industrial spatial concentration is sup-
ported by a functional specialization within
incumbent firms. Incumbents choose to separate
primary activities, such as management and research
and development (R&D), from secondary activities—
i.e., actual production—with the end result that
management and R&D are located in diverse cities
offering complementary services (Ono 2003), while
mass production is located in specialized areas.
Duranton and Puga’s (2001, 2005) models predict
that a sector’s geographic concentration is driven by
the desire of innovative firms to relocate mass
production to locations where production costs are
comparatively low due to the availability of inex-
pensive land or low-cost employees. Thus, a sector’s
geographic concentration is more driven by pecuniary
externalities than it is by intra-sectoral knowledge
externalities. Duranton and Puga’s prediction is
consistent with the empirical findings of Ellison and
Glaeser (1999) that at least half of the geographic
concentration in U.S. manufacturing industries is
driven by natural advantages, where natural advan-
tages are broadly defined and include the availability
of inexpensive land or low-cost labor.
In summary, we argue that an industry’s spatial
concentration, as measured by the Ellison–Glaeser
(1997) Index, increases along the industry lifecycle.
Therefore, by looking at spatial concentration, an
industry’s position along the lifecycle can be deter-
mined and, by extension, the industry’s entry potential
based on the demonstrated inverted U-shaped rela-
tionship. This logic leads to a potential instrument for
endogenous domestic entry in Aghion et al.’s (2009)
entry threat model and manages to allay several
concerns at the same time. For example, we are not
worried about problems of simultaneity between entry
and an industry’s spatial concentration, as Duranton
and Puga’s (2001) model predicts that an industry’s
spatial concentration of an industry is only driven by
the relocation decisions of past entrants. Further, we
are not worried that an industry’s spatial concentration
will have a direct effect on incumbent innovation, as
Duranton and Puga’s (2005) model predicts that
incumbents choose specialized areas for mass pro-
duction—and not for innovation. This clearly suggests
that these industries benefit from pecuniary external-
ities in goods production and not from an intra-
industry knowledge externalities in R&D.
In our empirical analyses, we make use of a rich
firm-level dataset (1987–2000) for West Germany.
Exploiting variation between industries within a
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single country has the advantage of a uniform
framework of common laws and institutional settings.
Furthermore, West Germany seems particularly suit-
able for our analysis, as it is characterized by a
pronounced coexistence of diversified and specialized
areas, probably due to its stable innovation system
(compare Audretsch et al. 2009). By means of our IV
approach, we find evidence that domestic entrants
have a positive effect on incumbents’ process inno-
vation, indicating that entry threat motivates incum-
bents to secure their existing market position;
however, we do find a negative effect on incumbents’
product innovation. Perhaps the advantage that new
entrants enjoy in the commercialization of new and
heterodox ideas discourages incumbent firms from
putting too much effort into product innovation. This
result probably extends what Cohen and Klepper’s
(1996a, b) model of firm size and the nature of
innovation would predict.
The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 introduces our data on firm entry
and incumbent innovation. In Sect. 3, we discuss our
empirical method and present results showing the
impact of domestic entry on incumbent innovation.
Section 4 summarizes the results and concludes with
some implications of our analysis.
2 Data on incumbent innovation and
entrepreneurship for West German
manufacturing industries
To investigate the effect of endogenous domestic
entry on the incumbent’s incentive to innovate, we
combine West German incumbent innovation data
with data on firm entry. We broadly define 11
manufacturing industries for the period 1987–2000
and conduct our analysis at the firm level after sorting
the firms into the 11 industries. Concentrating on a
single country is advantageous in that basic institu-
tions, such as regulation or administrative barriers,
and mentalities, such as entrepreneurial spirit, will be
the same throughout the country. Therefore, the
analysis should not be hampered by unobserved
country-specific characteristics as might be the case
in a cross-country analysis. Nevertheless, there is still
enough variation between industries within a single
country to make it possible to identify the impact of
entry on the incumbent’s incentive to innovate.
Industry-specific innovation activities of incum-
bent firms are derived from the Ifo Innovation Survey
(for a description of the dataset, see Lachenmaier
2007). More than 1,000 surveyed firms report annu-
ally on whether or not they have introduced an
innovation, i.e., a product or process innovation. The
surveyed firms are a subsample of firms that are
surveyed monthly for business cycle research. There-
fore, there is no special focus on young firms or
startups in the subsample. Furthermore, all surveyed
firms have at least 20 employees. These specifics
make it possible to derive information on incumbent
innovation behavior from the Ifo Innovation Survey
(compare Falck 2009).
We construct different outcome measures to
capture as accurately as possible those innovations
that were introduced as a result of increased compe-
tition due to entry. We start with the most general
measure of innovation, which is simply a binary
variable equaling 1 if a firm introduced an innovation
in the year preceding the survey. This variable is then
deconstructed to distinguish between product and
process innovations. Product and process innovations
are subsequently augmented with any additional
information that firms provide about the innovation
process. When answering questions about their
innovation behavior, firms are given a wide selection
of motivations to choose from in explaining where
the impulse for the innovation process originated. We
use the answer ‘‘from a competitor’’ to construct an
innovation measure that is again binary and equals 1
if a firm introduced a product or process innovation
based on an impulse that came from a competitor. In
our opinion, this measure is the best way to capture
those incumbent innovations that were motivated by
fear of competition.
Information on firm entry in an industry is derived
from the German Social Insurance Statistics (for a
description of the dataset, see Brixy and Fritsch
2004). The German Social Insurance Statistics
requires every employer to report certain information,
such as qualifications, about every employee subject
to obligatory social insurance. The information
collected can be transformed into an establishment
file that provides longitudinal information about the
establishments and their employees. As each estab-
lishment with at least one employee subject to social
security has a permanent individual code number, the
appearance of a new code number can be interpreted
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as an entry. The unit of measurement is the estab-
lishment, not the firm. The empirical data thus
derived include two categories of entities: firm
headquarters and subsidiaries. Because several stud-
ies have documented that ‘‘de novo’’ entries tend to
be small, new establishments with more than 20
employees in the first year of their existence are
excluded from our sample, resulting in a considerable
number of new subsidiaries of large firms contained
in the database not being counted as real entries.
These new subsidiaries are probably the result of a
functional specialization within large incumbent
firms that, eventually, drives an industry’s geographic
concentration.
Industry geographic concentration is measured by
an index proposed by Ellison and Glaeser (1997):









1  Hð Þ ð1Þ
Employment data from the establishment file of the
German Social Insurance Statistics are used to
calculate the Ellison–Glaeser index, where G is the
Gini coefficient of concentration and xr is the
industry’s share of overall manufacturing employ-
ment in region r. The regions are 75 West German
planning regions. The 1 PMr¼1 x2r
 
term is included
so that the index has the property E EGð Þ ¼ 0 when
neither agglomerative spillovers nor natural advan-
tage are present. H is the Herfindahl index of the
industry’s establishment size distribution. The Her-
findahl index is calculated according to the method
proposed by Schmalensee (1977). As industries are
defined very broadly, it is not surprising that the
Ellison–Glaeser index is relatively small for each of
the 11 industries. Nevertheless, for all industries, the
Ellison–Glaeser index is larger than zero, which
implies excess concentration (see Table 1 for descrip-
tive statistics).
Table 1 sets out descriptive statistics at the
industry level. Electrical apparatus, radio, TV, com-
munication, office machinery, and computers have
both the highest incumbent innovation rate (63.9%)
and the highest entry rate (7.3%).1 In contrast, food
and tobacco has the smallest entry rate (3.6%) and
also a fairly small innovation rate (36.7%). These
descriptive statistics alone provide some evidence of
how the threat of entry influences incumbent
innovation.
3 Estimation and results
3.1 The strategy
To assess the effect of domestic entry on the
incumbent’s incentive to innovate, we are interested
in estimating the following innovation production
function:
Pr Innofit ¼ 1jEntry;X
 ¼aþb1 log Entryitð Þ
þXfitb2 þXitb3 þ efit
ð2Þ
Pr ð Þ is the conditional probability of an incumbent
having introduced an innovation. Thereby, Innofit is
the binary variable indicating whether firm f in
industry i (i = 1,…,11) introduced an innovation
(product or process) in year t (t = 1987,…,2000).
Entryit is the number of entries in industry i at time t.
b1, the coefficient of interest, is a measure of the
impact of entry on the incumbent’s incentive to
innovate. Xfit is a set of firm-level control variables,
including firm size (in terms of employment), firm
location (a dummy for the federal state), and
innovation inputs measured as expenditures commit-
ted to innovation activities to control for an individ-
ual firm’s input in the innovation process. This is the
sum of different possible expenditures that foster
innovation, such as, expenditures for R&D, construc-
tion and design, patents, and investment made in
preparation for innovation. Additionally, the innova-
tion expenditures’ share of a firm’s revenues is
included to scale the expenditures according to the
financial size of the establishment. Unfortunately, at
least one of the latter two variables is missing for
5,197 observations. After checking for the random-
ness of the missing values, we drop these observa-
tions. Our final sample contains 10,351 observations
(compare Table 1). We use these observations as
1 The innovation rate is defined as the number of firms that
have reported an innovation (process or product innovation)
over the number of all firms of the respective industry that have
participated in the Ifo Innovation Survey. The entry rate is the
number of entries out of the number of establishments in the
Footnote 1 continued
respective industry as derived from the establishment file of the
Social Insurance Statistics.
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repeated cross-sections, including dummies for sur-
vey year as controls.
Xit is a set of industry-level control variables,
including the size of the industry (in terms of
employment), annual industry employment change
to control for industry-specific business cycles, and
the share of employees with a degree in engineering or
natural science. Engineers and natural scientists are
most likely to be employed in R&D. We therefore use
the share of employees with a degree in engineering or
natural science in an industry as a control for the
knowledge intensity of an industry. Both variables are
derived from the Social Insurance Statistics.
Entry is expected to be endogenous on its own
merits and depends on incumbent innovation. There-
fore, we use an IV approach to instrument entry in the
first stage. Our IV approach is based on Klepper’s
(1996) observation of an inverted U-shaped relation-
ship between the industry’s position in the lifecycle
and domestic entry. To this we add Duranton and
Puga’s (2001, 2005) insight into the spatial dimension
of the industry lifecycle, which is that an industry’s
spatial concentration increases with age. The result is
expected to be an inverted U-shaped relationship
between entry in an industry and that industry’s spatial
concentration as measured by the Ellison–Glaeser
Index and, indeed, this effect is observed in our data
(compare Table 1). For example, the ‘‘young’’ com-
puter industry has one of the smallest values of the
Ellison–Glaeser Index, whereas the mature chemical
industry has by far the largest. Equation 3 reflects the
assumed relationship between entry in an industry and
spatial concentration of that industry:
log Entryitð Þ ¼ a þ b1EGit  b2EG2it þ Xfitb3
þ Xitb4 þ efit ð3Þ
We use only the predicted value of this first-stage
model in our second-stage model (compare Eq. 2).
The first-stage model does not include industry
dummies due to the fact that geographic industry
concentration is very persistent over time. Persistency
means that there is very little time series within-
industry variation that can be exploited. This persis-
tence of the Ellison–Glaeser Index basically signifies
that the period 1987–2000 can be viewed as a mere
snapshot taken at one point in time of the long-run
industry evolution.
However, we are looking at variation of the
Ellison–Glaeser Index across industries as well as
within them. As the latter is rather small due to the
above-mentioned persistence effect, we are mostly
interested in the entry variation in industries that is
driven by the actual state of the industry lifecycle and
the resulting geographic concentration. This part of
the variation is not driven by current innovation
activity and can, therefore, be considered exogenous
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Industry n Innovation rate Entry rate Ellison–Glaeser index
SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean
Food and tobacco 700 0.114 0.367 0.002 0.036 0.00018 0.0023
Textiles, apparel, and leather 879 0.095 0.358 0.007 0.064 0.00015 0.0116
Wood products, furniture, paper, and pulp 1,912 0.071 0.300 0.006 0.059 0.00029 0.0063
Publishing and printing 933 0.075 0.202 0.006 0.063 0.0001 0.0017
Chemicals 155 0.158 0.568 0.009 0.048 0.00137 0.0182
Rubber and plastics 755 0.109 0.401 0.009 0.059 0.00018 0.0024
Non-metallic mineral products 796 0.115 0.396 0.004 0.043 0.00127 0.0095
Metals and fabricated metal products 1,182 0.112 0.351 0.006 0.067 0.00113 0.0087
Machinery 1,597 0.112 0.548 0.005 0.060 0.00013 0.0012
Electrical apparatus, radio, TV, communication,
office machinery, and computers
1,238 0.101 0.639 0.006 0.073 0.00047 0.0038
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 204 0.159 0.632 0.004 0.056 0.00074 0.0068
Total 10,351 0.167 0.411 0.011 0.059 0.00379 0.0054
SD, Standard deviation
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in our regression framework using incumbent inno-
vation as the outcome.
Since the first stage of our estimation occurs on a
higher level of aggregation, i.e., the industry level, and
the second stage is estimated at the firm level, we end
up with a two-stage estimation framework in a nested
sample, as described by Karaca-Mandic and Train
(2003). To control for correlation among observations
within each industry, we use a robust covariance
estimator in the first step (compare Rogers 1993).
However, the use of a robust covariance estimator in
this setup is appropriate only if there is no error in the
first stage (compare Karaca-Mandic and Train 2003,
p. 404). Therefore, in a subsequent step, we bootstrap
the full instrumental variable regression. Karaca-
Mandic and Train (2003) show that the bootstrap
procedure leads to more reliable standard errors.
3.2 Results
As our outcome variable is binary, we estimate
Eq. 2 with probit models. We also run linear
probability models, as suggested by Angrist (2001),
and qualitatively obtain the same results as in the
probit models. Thus, we report results from the
probit models only. Table 2 sets out the results of
the simple probit regressions of Eq. 2. The depen-
dent variable is either of the binary variables
reporting whether a firm has introduced a product
innovation or a process innovation in the preceding
year. Both outcome variables are further narrowed
down to those innovations motivated in some way
by a competitor. This leaves us with four outcome
measures.
In all specifications, the domestic entry coefficient
is not significantly different from zero, which is in
line with Aghion et al.’s findings (2009). However,
when instrumenting Entry by EG and EG2, the entry
coefficient becomes significantly different from zero,
suggesting that we have succeeded in isolating
leading-edge domestic entry in technologically pro-
gressive industries. The results of the instrumental
variable approach are summarized in Table 3. In the
first stage, the expected inverted U-shaped















































































Observations 9,987 9,987 9,987 9,987
Pseudo-R2 0.464 0.363 0.379 0.311
*** p \ 0.01, ** p \ 0.05, * p \ 0.1
Cluster-robust z-statistics on the industry level are given in parenthesis
Dummies for years and federal states not shown
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relationship between Entry and the Ellison-Glaeser
index is found across industries.
The results of the second stage reveal that
instrumented entry has a significantly positive impact
on process innovation, but a negative influence on
product innovation. To confirm the validity of our
instruments, we included the Ellison–Glaeser Index
directly in the first non-instrumented probit model to
see whether it has a direct influence on firm
innovation behavior. The coefficient of the Ellison–
Glaeser index is not significantly different from zero
when controlling for entry in this model. This
suggests that the Ellison–Glaeser Index is a valid
instrument for entry since it has no direct effect on
innovation behavior beyond the indirect effect via the
entry variable. The validity of the instruments is
further reinforced by the v2-test of joint significance
of the excluded instruments in the first stage.
Marginal effects are calculated at the sample mean
of variables and since the entry variable is coded in
logs, the corresponding interpretation is in semi-
elasticities (compare Table 4). The computed mar-
ginal effects implied by the estimates suggest that a
1% increase in leading-edge domestic entry for an
industry leads to a 5.3% point decrease in the
probability that the incumbent will introduce a
product innovation and a 2.6% point increase in the
probability that the incumbent will introduce a
process innovation.
As the robust covariance estimator in this setup is
valid only under relatively strong assumptions, in a
further step we bootstrap the full instrumental variable




































































































v2-test of EG = EG2 = 0 22.435*** 22.435*** 22.457*** 22.448***
Observations 9,987 9,987 9,987 9,987
*** p \ 0.01, ** p \ 0.05, * p \ 0.1
Cluster-robust z-statistics on the industry level are given in parenthesis
Dummies for years and federal states not shown
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regression, a process that should result in more reliable
standard errors of the coefficients. Point estimates and
marginal effects are the same as described previously,
since only the standard errors are computed differently.
This different method of computing the standard errors
results in a decline of the significance levels but, even
so, our hypothesis as to the negative influence instru-
mented entry has on product innovation and its positive
influence on process innovation can be maintained
(compare Table 5).
4 Conclusions
Our instrumental variable approach confirms Aghion
et al.’s (2009) theory that leading-edge entry has an
impact on an incumbent’s incentive to innovate, an
effect that is positive only in regard to process
innovations. In contrast to Aghion et al. (2009), our
choice of instruments is based on the assumption that
leading-edge entry is not foreign entry but, rather,
domestic entry in technologically progressive indus-
tries. The negative impact of domestic entry on
incumbent product innovation can be viewed as
further support for Audretsch’s (1995) findings that
new products are most likely to be introduced by new
entrants that have not yet developed routines that
inhibit thinking outside the box. The advantage that
new entrants enjoy in the commercialization of new
and heterodox ideas might discourage incumbent
firms from putting too much effort into product
innovation. This idea fits with Baumol’s (2002)
‘‘David–Goliath Symbiosis,’’ which has to do with
how the work of innovation is divided between large
incumbent firms and small new firms.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which
permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction
in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are
credited.









Number of entrants (log) -0.053** -0.024* 0.026*** 0.013**
Spending on innovation (log) 0.115*** 0.062*** 0.079*** 0.043***
Spending on innovation (percentage of
revenues)
-0.0001*** -0.00006*** -0.00002 -0.00002**
Number of employees (log) -0.048*** -0.027*** -0.035*** -0.017***
Number of employees in industry (log) 0.107 0.048 -0.061* -0.027*
Annual change in employment in industry
(%)
-0.01 -0.0046* 0.006** 0.003
R&D employment: percentage of
engineers and natural scientists
-0.287 0.016 0.44 0.445**
*** p \ 0.01, ** p \ 0.05, * p \ 0.1
Table 5 Comparison of significance levels with different standard errors






IV probit Product innovation -0.053 ** ***
IV probit Product innovation
(Impulse from competitor)
-0.024 * *
IV probit Process innovation 0.026 *** *
IV probit Process innovation
(Impulse from competitor)
0.013 ** –
*** p \ 0.01, ** p \ 0.05, * p \ 0.1
IV, Instrumental variable; SE, standard error
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